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Managing Spoilers in a Hybrid War:
The Democratic Republic of Congo
(1996–2010)
DAVID FUAMBA∗,∗∗, MASAKO YONEKAWA†,‡
AND ANNETTE SEEGERS§
ABSTRACT Scholarship on the management of spoilers in a hybrid type of conflict
is almost non-existent. Through an examination of the recent Congolese wars and
peace efforts (1996–2010), we develop an understanding of how spoilers are
managed in a conflict characterised by both interstate and intrastate dynamics.
Certainly, more strategies of dealing with spoiler behaviours in this type of
conflict are likely to emerge as similar cases are investigated, but our
discussion recommends these non-related, but strongly interacting principles:
the practice of inclusivity, usually preferred in the management of spoilers, is
more complex, and in fact ineffective, particularly when concerned groups’
internal politics and supportive alliances are unconventional. Because holding
elections is often deemed indispensable in peacemaking efforts, it is vital that
total spoilers be prevented from winning or disrupting them. The toughest
challenge is the protection of civilians, especially when the state lacks a
monopoly on the use of violence and governance remains partitioned across the
country.
Introduction
In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since 1996, many agreements about
reducing or ending violence have been reached after complicated, costly, and
lengthy negotiations. These include bilateral and multilateral agreements prior
to 1999, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (1999), the agreement between the
Rwandan and the Kinshasa Governments (the Pretoria Accord of 2002), the
Global and All-Inclusive Agreement and Final Act of Endorsement (2003), and
agreements about security sector reform. A United Nations (UN) presence in
the DRC, known by its French acronym MONUC,1 was created in the aftermath
of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in 1999, first as a small liaison force and later
as a bigger force to implement the Ceasefire Agreement.
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Peace efforts in the DRC are interesting because so many things have gone
wrong in the peacemaking and peacekeeping phases. These efforts are also rel-
evant in that the violence continues, and spoiling behaviours remain one of
their most striking characteristics. Spoiling did not simply happen during the
peacemaking phase of the conflict. As soon as the Lusaka Agreement was
signed, for example, the violence in the DRC escalated and expanded (Cilliers
and Malan 2001). Violence continued between rebel groups and Congolese
Government forces, while the former Rwandan military (the Forces Armées
Rwandaises or FAR) and Interahamwe militants,2 supported by the Kinshasa Gov-
ernment, launched attacks into the Rwandan territory (Dagne 2005; Rogier 2005).
Rwanda itself maintained about 23,000 troops in the DRC. Uganda had 10,000
(Weiss 2000; Cilliers and Malan 2001, 10–66). In 2003/2004, the UN Security
Council authorised Chapter 7 or peace enforcement powers to MONUC to
protect UN personnel, as well as civilians under imminent threat of physical
violence. MONUC has been plagued by failures and problems, as can be seen
in numerous withering reports (see Amnesty International 2009; Human Rights
Watch 2009), some by the UN itself (see UN 2009). The UN deployment pro-
ceeded at a glacial pace. In 1999 and 2000, the Kabila Senior Government
perceived the UN deployment of its liaison officers and military observers on
Congolese soil as insulting and wanted the UN territorially restricted to neutral
areas. Rebels followed suit. The UN has since struggled to reduce violence
against civilians and UN personnel (Braeckman, Le Monde Diplomatique
7 April 2001, 2–5; Cilliers and Malan 2001; Swart and Solomon 2004).
Quite logically, many scholars try to explain why the peacemaking and peace-
keeping efforts have not yielded better results:
First, some rather fatalistic explanations argue that the DRC’s conflict has a
non-negotiable character, due to the country’s ethnic politics (see Vlassenroot
2006; Turner 2007), to spill-over from Rwanda (Reed 1998), and/or to the char-
acter of the country’s governance (which has destroyed public institutions)
(Young 1994; Hibou 2004; Renton et al. 2007).
A second explanation is provided by the strategies of mediation. Inclusive nego-
tiations are often sought because mediators think it better to include those who are
or are likely to be spoilers. By late 2001, however, the DRC negotiations had more
than 350 participating delegates (Khadiagala 2009, 73), with ever-increasing
unlikelihood that the major disputes will be resolved (Rogier 2004; also see
Viken 2009). To keep the process going, the agenda had to narrow, and it
primarily shrunk to power-sharing (Rogier 2004, 39). Eventually, the major agree-
ments consisted of little more than ceasefires.
A third explanation hones in on South Africa (SA) as a mediator. Under Presi-
dent Thabo Mbeki, SA actively sought a role as a conflict mediator in Africa and
offered to commit a great many resources to this end in the DRC conflict, includ-
ing personnel for MONUC and post-conflict assistance, and lobbied for the com-
mitment of international resources (Khadiagala 2009, 70–73). With it not being
the officially designated mediator of the South African Development Community
(SADC), SA’s prominent role was primarily a product of its promises of assistance
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along with its neutral stance during SADC’s support of the DRC Government. As
a mediator, SA was said to export its own experience, officially understood to
consist of an all-inclusive national convention that produces an agreement, a
transitional government, and a government of national unity (Mamdani, Mail &
Guardian, May 23–29, 1997, 10).
In a context where peace is so elusive, it becomes important to ask a descrip-
tive question about the management of spoilers: How does the UN manage,
however imperfectly, those who use violence? We accept Carayannis’ (2005,
83–106) characterisation of the DRC war as hybrid: our intent is to identify
the main features of managing spoilers in the DRC’s hybrid war. Our discussion
spans the period between 1996 and 2010. Many issues including, but not limited
to, the 2011 elections—characterised by violence and also said not to be free
and fair—influenced the post-2010 political dynamics in the DRC. These
dynamics affected MONUC/MONUSCO. For this reason, we end our analysis
in 2010.
Our discussion begins with a brief outline of spoilers in the context of a hybrid
type of conflict. We define the spoiler concept and concisely review major strat-
egies of management in order to introduce the DRC case. Thereafter, we identify
the DRC interstate and intrastate spoilers. Subsequent discussions include our
definition of the spoiler-management concept and a critical examination of strat-
egies and techniques that DRC peace managers had devised in order to address
major encountered spoiling behaviours. We partly do so by reviewing important
aspects of the efforts such as the negotiations leading to main agreements. From
these discussions emerge our recommendations, which we boldly re-emphasise
in our conclusion.
Spoilers in a hybrid conflict
Spoilers, according to Stedman (1997, 5), are ‘leaders or parties that believe that
peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests,
and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it’. Spoilers can be found
within or outside the peace processes and in all phases of negotiation. Spoiling be-
haviour is very likely when none of the fighting groups has been completely
defeated; parties retain the means to resume fighting if they are upset with the
peace agreement (Licklider 1995). Rebel groups also may not want to surrender
the gains that they have made during their campaigns (Tull and Mehler 2005).
In Stedman’s (1997, 12) view, mediators should understand the extent and
nature of the problem, examine spoilers’ motivations, and accordingly adapt
their strategies. Types of spoilers require different management. Spoilers can be
classified as (i) internal and external and (ii) limited, greedy, and total. A total
spoiler cannot be accommodated, and so either force must be used to defeat it
or ‘the departing train strategy’ must be used, whereby the increasing momentum
generated is enough to make the spoiler realise that peace will come and that it will
be marginalised (see Stedman 1996, 369–371; Hampson 2001, 391; Doyle and
Sambanis 2006, 50).
POLITIKON: SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL STUDIES
321
Critics have identified weaknesses in the spoiler-management literature:
First, some groups may have very morally legitimate reasons for their behav-
iour. War crimes, for example, are not always addressed by peace agreements
(Newman and Richmond 2006).
Second, the use of violence during negotiations is not always aimed at destroy-
ing the peace process but is a technique of negotiation (Newman and Richmond
2006, 2–8). The use of violence becomes more likely as an actor thinks that it
is giving too much away to gain a place at the bargaining table.3
Finally, to a significant extent, the identification of a spoiler lies in the eyes of
the beholder. One side’s ‘reasonable demands’ may be nothing more than spoiling
from another perspective (Newman and Richmond 2006, 2–8).
As is evident from the above, the notion of spoilers functions primarily in
relation to peacemaking; it is a major explanation of why so many peace agree-
ments fall apart.
In a hybrid conflict, spoilers come from within and beyond a country’s borders.
A hybrid conflict, according to Carayannis, combines the properties of a civil or
intrastate war with interstate war. An interstate war consists of actors who chal-
lenge the sovereignty of a country and invade, occupy, or conquer that country
in part or as a whole. An intrastate war consists of actors challenging the govern-
ment of a country: they want the government or a part of it reformed, replaced, or
destroyed. The principals involved in both intrastate and interstate wars typically
form a network rather than functioning as stand-alone actors. The networked
nature of the conflicts, of course, makes it difficult to draw a clear line between
interstate and intrastate wars (Carayannis 2005). But from the point of view of
managing the networked spoilers, it makes a huge difference.
The DRC as a hybrid conflict
The Congolese conflict contains many levels. Levels are interconnected, and each
contains different actors, all of whom can act as spoilers.
Interstate spoilers
(1) Rwanda under the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) Government: This govern-
ment has continued to provide military support to groups in the DRC
(Hoebeke 2005). The DRC indeed contains
(i) soldiers and para-militaries of the former Rwandan military (the FAR);
(ii) Interahamwe or Hutu militants (regrouped as the Forces Démocratiques
pour la Libération du Rwanda—FDLR) who had fled to the DRC after
their involvement in the Rwandan war and genocide; and
(iii) refugees in camps, a natural recruiting ground for Hutu rebels.
(2) Uganda: Originally partnered with Rwanda, the Ugandan Government sub-
sequently pursued a more independent course of action, among others, in sup-
porting armed groups in north-eastern DRC, such as the Mouvement pour la
Libération du Congo (MLC). Another spoiler with direct connection to
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Uganda is the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). For many years, the LRA has
remained the most active Ugandan rebel movement operating in and from the
Congo (Wadada-Nabudere 2004).
(3) Resource exploitation networks: These include governments and their leaders,
influential individuals, armed groups, and corporations (Kisangani 2003;
Jackson 2006). The DRC has an abundance of portable resources: cobalt,
coltan, copper, diamonds, gold, manganese, tin, tungsten, and uranium
(Gourou 2003). Ituri, the two Kivu provinces, and Katanga are the best-
endowed mineral provinces of the DRC. Rwanda and Uganda, along with
more distant partners, are heavily involved in the smuggling network (UN
2001, 2005; International Court of Justice 2005).
Intrastate spoilers
(1) Armed groups made up of rebels against the Kabila Senior and Junior Govern-
ments: one such group is the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD). Formed
in 1998 and supported by Rwanda and Uganda, the RCD also fought Hutu
groups in eastern DRC. It later split into several factions. Rebels to the
post-Mobutu Governments further included Congolese Tutsi, dismissed
from their positions in the Kinshasa Government, and Rwandan soldiers,
once part of the AFDL that brought Kabila Senior to power (Kisangani
2003, 51–81). Rebels to the Laurent-Desiré Kabila (Kabila Senior) and
Joseph Kabila (Kabila Junior) Governments included armed groups made
up of former members of the defeated Mobutu Government.
(2) Congolese armed groups of Rwandan origin: these primarily consist of
Rwandese people who have been in what became the DRC since the nine-
teenth century (Human Rights Watch 2004; Rafti 2006; Young 2006). The
DRC’s eastern provinces have over several centuries developed close econ-
omic, social, and cultural relationships with Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda.
Banyarwanda4 migrated to the Congo in the nineteenth century. Belgium,
the colonial power in both the DRC and Rwanda, encouraged or forced
Banyarwanda migration to and settlement in the DRC. Frequent famines
also forced migration,5 as did violent decolonisation and state violence in
Rwanda (UNHCR 2000, 49–50). In 1955, an estimated 160,000 Banyar-
wanda were living in eastern DRC (Jackson 1996; Mamdani 2002, 243;
Vlassenroot and Huggins 2005, 129). Tutsi6 are a small part of this group,
today numbering several hundred thousands and constituting between 1 and
2% of the total Congolese population of some 60 million (Human Rights
Watch 2007, 9; see also Lemarchand 2000).
In the DRC, access to land required Congolese nationality. After the DRC’s
independence, legislation about the Banyarwanda claims to Congolese nationality
changed several times, granting it in the early 1960s, denying it in the 1970s,
returning it in the late 1970s, and so on (Jackson 1996, 104; Nest et al. 2006;
Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, 69–80). Locals for various reasons were fearful and
resentful of the Banyarwanda influence and access to land (Jackson 1996,
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104–105; Mamdani 2002, 243). The Kinshasa Government never could stick to
one policy, among others, because Banyarwanda managed to obtain high positions
in the DRC’s politics and society (Prunier 1998, 379; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004, 3;
International Crisis Group 2005, 8; Nest et al. 2006, 21). On their part, the Banyar-
wanda were insecure, too, especially when the Mobutu Government in the early
1980s revoked past legislation, turning Banyarwanda (especially Tutsi) into state-
less people (Jackson 1996, 105).
By the late 1980s, Hutu–Tutsi distinctions among Banyarwanda were emerging
very clearly; for example, the old Banyarwanda organisation, Umoja, split into
two bodies, one based in the Hutu community in North Kivu. Its agenda was to
identify indigenous Hutu in the DRC in order to grant them nationality. Tutsi
formed their own organisation (Jackson 1996, 121; Mamdani 2002, 251–252;
Turner 2007, 118). Despite the obvious east–west differences in the DRC,
underlined by the absence of infrastructural links, President Mobutu contributed
significantly to the single, national Congolese identity (Weiss and Carayannis
2004). This achievement was overshadowed by corruption and appalling govern-
ance, aided and abetted by the USA during the Cold War. After 1990, President
Mobutu lost much western support and embarked on a half-hearted reform cam-
paign including, for reasons of needing support, anti-Tutsi sentiments. Tutsi
were expelled from North Kivu and Banyamulenge7 were threatened with the
same in South Kivu (Weiss and Carayannis 2004, 105–142). Significantly,
locals demanded that both Hutu and Tutsi ‘foreigners’ be barred from political
participation in the DRC, giving Banyarwanda a reason to forget about Hutu–
Tutsi differences (Jackson 1996, 105–106). The outbreak of war in Rwanda in
1990 destroyed this rapprochement. Hostilities increased. Lacking protection
from the Mobutu Government, communities created protection militias (Inter-
national Crisis Group 2005, 9). The situation in North Kivu deteriorated fast; by
early 1994, between 6000 and 10,000 people were killed and more than
250,000 displaced (UNHCR 2000, 258; Mamdani 2002, 245; Overseas Develop-
ment Institute 2005).
Congolese of Rwandan origin can be described as having a permanent insecur-
ity dilemma as their fate—economic and otherwise—depends on the DRC Gov-
ernment, which naturally comes under pressure from other Congolese tribal
groups for granting rights to exiles and migrants (Human Rights Watch 2004;
Rafti 2006; Young 2006, 302–308).
(3) Rwandan Extremists, Exiles and Refugees: the 1990–1994 war in Rwanda,
which ended in genocide, featured the Rwandan military (FAR), Hutu extre-
mists, and Interahamwe as perpetrators. The RPF gained victory in July 1994.
The RPF’s victory caused a massive influx of 1.2 million Rwandan Hutu refu-
gees and defeated FAR and Interahamwe into neighbouring countries. The
majority entered eastern DRC, where 80,000 refugees from Burundi were
already sheltering (Mamdani 2002, 246–254; Reyntjens 2006, 111). The
DRC military and France protected the Hutu refugees, and some genocidaires
with arms were led to safe places, including refugee camps (Mamdani 2002,
246; Hugo 2006, 22). One reaction to the influx was the creation of the
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Democratic Alliance of People (ADP) by a Congolese Tutsi to lobby for
nationality for Banyarwanda and to protect Tutsi from Hutu genocidaires.
The ADP became a partner of Rwanda and Uganda in the overthrow of the
Mobutu Government in 1996.
There are some who would say that any discussion of spoilers of peace in the
DRC should identify Rwanda under the RPF Government as the main spoiler.
Such a view often roots the cause of the DRC’s lack of peace in the 1990–
1994 war in Rwanda, more specifically the 1994 genocide. Spoiling, in other
words, can all be traced to Rwanda, and thus, if Rwanda is managed, all other
spoiling will wither away. But to us, the character of governance and politics in
the DRC is equally important: out of bad or non-existent governance, groups
emerge and they spoil—without Rwandan support (see Young 1994, 247–263;
Hibou 2004; Vlassenroot 2006, 49–65; Renton et al. 2007; Turner 2007).
Two comments can be made about this debate. First, as we show above, the
number and behaviour of the spoilers change; the spoilers are opportunistic and
can turn on their masters quite quickly. Groups created by Rwanda have turned
on Rwanda. Second, one must distinguish between conditions at the start of a con-
flict and conditions created by the conflict. Rwanda may well have the most to do
with the 1996 war, but, after 1996, the conflict facilitated (for example) the emer-
gence of small, selfish, and violent groups typical of a resource war (Nest et al.
2006; also see Loffman 2007).
Managing the DRC spoilers
What we mean by managing spoilers
Managing spoilers should not be understood as managing those who initiated a
conflict; rather, it is about dealing with those who are or have become the main
impediments to ending the violence. In the DRC context, ‘dealing’ represents
an ensemble of strategies that peacemakers devised in order to address concerns
of, control, or defeat individuals or organisations whose behaviours threaten
their efforts.8
Managing the interstate spoilers
In August 1998, the Second Congo War was initiated against the government of
Kabila Senior by his former allies, Rwanda and Uganda, as well as Congolese
Tutsi regrouped into the RCD. About three weeks later, the SADC initiated its
peacemaking efforts, seeking peace through (a) an immediate ceasefire and (b)
the start of a political dialogue.
But who should participate in the negotiations? And what was the purpose of the
negotiations?
UN Resolution 1234 (1999) stated that all warring parties needed to be recog-
nised and should participate in the negotiations. Yet a major ‘warring party’ and
the biggest potential spoiler, Rwanda, denied any involvement in the DRC. Later
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(in 1998), Rwanda not only admitted to its troops being in the DRC and supporting
the RCD, but also claimed that this involvement was justified because the FAR
and Interahamwe militants taking refuge in the DRC were guilty of genocide
and because the DRC’s eastern neighbours were threatened by the Hutus’ political
behaviour in the DRC (see Cilliers and Malan 2001, 10–66; Clark, The Monitor
10 October 2004, 12–27). The Rwandan admission extended and intensified the
conflict.
With Rwanda having admitted that it was involved, the Kinshasa Government
secured SADC’s military assistance (Coleman 2007). The Kinshasa Government
started cultivating its relations with Hutu exiles and refugees and its already pro-
vocative anti-Tutsi rhetoric reached incendiary levels of intensity. Rwanda’s ally
in the previous actions against the DRC, Uganda, was clearly alarmed by what
could be a Rwandan bid for regional dominance and thus struck out on its own,
increasing its support of pro-Uganda armed groups, such as the MLC and RCD-
Kisangani, in the north-eastern areas of the DRC (Clark 2001). When the rebels
advanced quickly and threatened Kinshasa, the Kabila Senior Government
requested SADC’s assistance and the SADC agreed. Angola, Namibia, and Zim-
babwe sent troops to help. The SADC also appointed Zambian President Chiluba
as the mediator.
Various bilateral, multilateral, and summit meetings were held and a few agree-
ments reached, such as the Sirte (Libya) agreement between the DRC and Uganda,
but none made much impact. In mid-1999, however, negotiations in Lusaka
achieved some success. Here Congolese armed groups met for negotiations for
the first time. Eventually, the rebel groups and six African governments involved
in the war signed a ceasefire agreement, known as the Lusaka Ceasefire Agree-
ment. A ceasefire was probably the only thing about which the participants
could agree (Swart and Solomon 2004). With a ceasefire having been concluded,
the UN created a monitoring force, MONUC.9 Rwanda was not a party to the
Lusaka Agreement, although it had admitted to militarily helping DRC rebels.
As soon as the Lusaka Agreement was signed, the violence in the DRC esca-
lated and expanded (Cilliers and Malan 2001, 10–66). Ex-FAR and Interahamwe
militants, supported by the Kinshasa Government, launched attacks into Rwandan
territory (Dagne 2005, 1–6; Rogier 2005, 3–24). Rwanda itself maintained about
23,000 troops in the DRC. Uganda had 10,000 (Weiss 2000, 1–25; Cilliers and
Malan 2001, 10–66).
How were Rwanda and Uganda as spoilers managed at this point (when the war
is going from bad to worse)?
The mediators returned to a more state-centric, bilateral approach and con-
ducted a separate set of negotiations in Pretoria which included governments
only. The Pretoria negotiations led to two agreements: the Luanda Agreement,
about Ugandan troops in the DRC, and an agreement between the DRC and
Rwanda. These agreements were about neighbouring countries as spoilers them-
selves and as patrons of DRC spoilers (Cilliers and Malan 2001, 10–66).
In an agreement between the Rwandan and the Congolese Governments (the
Pretoria Accord) of July 2002, Rwanda agreed to withdraw its troops from the
D. FUAMBA ET AL.
326
Congo. The Kabila Junior Government promised to disarm ex-FAR and Intera-
hamwe fighters.10 The other SADC countries involved, such as Angola,
Namibia, and Zimbabwe, also agreed to withdraw their troops from the Congo.
A Joint Military Commission (JMC) would monitor the ceasefire and oversee
the withdrawal of foreign troops. MONUC was to track down and disarm ‘nega-
tive forces’. Genocidaires would be handed over to the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda (ICTR) or repatriated to their countries (Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement 1999; Cilliers and Malan 2001, 10–66).
Although foreign troops remained in the DRC for much longer than the Lusaka
Agreement intended, the Rwandan and Uganda troops had been officially with-
drawn by October 2001.11 For our purposes, however, the point is that the
intent of the negotiations was to gain a commitment from Rwanda and Uganda
to not invade, occupy, or conquer the DRC in part or as a whole.
Managing the intrastate spoilers
An elected government
The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement contained remarkable clauses and commitments
about governance in the DRC: National dialogue (through the Inter-Congolese
Dialogue—ICD) and reconciliation would start. State administration would be
re-established. With the help of the JMC, a national army for the DRC would
be created (Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 1999; Cilliers and Malan 2001, 10–66).
When Joseph Kabila succeeded his assassinated father in 2001, he promised to
make peace. The ICD started in Ethiopia in October 2001. Soon, SA had ‘taken
over’ as a mediator, as well as a host. Subsequent ICD meetings were all to be
held in SA (Sun City). For all its wishes, the ICD (with Botswana’s former Pre-
sident Masire as the initial facilitator) did manage to include major and small
armed groups, local militias, representatives of civil society, leaders of political
parties of opposition, and the Kinshasa Government.
Excluded from the ICD were groups capable and willing of spoiling. Also
excluded were the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and LRA fighters, declared criminals
and supposedly hunted down by MONUC and handed over to the ICTR. Small
splintered RCD groups which continue violence over the citizenship and access
to land rights for Banyarwanda were also disqualified (Boshoff and Rupiya
2003). Resource exploitation networks were also excluded. Resource exploitation
networks had concluded agreements with numerous armed groups in the DRC.
This was particularly evident in the Kivu provinces controlled by the Rwanda-
backed RCD-Goma.
At the start of the ICD, the multiplying tendencies of the Congolese participants
were in full view. In the east, the RCD now had become the RCD-Goma, RCD-
Kisangani, RCD-ML, and the RC-National. About 22 local self-defence groups
or militias, known as the Mai-Mai, were represented by General Padiri. In the
northwest was a new group, the MLC (Weiss 2000, 18).
As spoilers multiplied, the negotiation process became more complicated. A
‘vicious cycle’ was in effect: more groups both clamoured for inclusion and
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repeatedly splintered, presenting mediators with no choice but to engage with
whoever was willing.12
Discussions over soft issues provided momentum to the negotiations. But some
issues, such as power-sharing and security sector reform, brought everything to a
halt (Cilliers and Malan 2001, 22–66; Swart and Solomon 2004, 15–23). Some
groups, such as the MLC, seemed content to get any share of governmental
power. The RCD was different: it wanted a share proportional to what it
already controlled in territory, commercial contracts, resources, etc. It wanted
the executive, to rotate among the Kabila Government and different formations.
The RCD would not back down and indeed exercised the power of veto over
the negotiations (Weiss 2000, 2–20; Boshoff and Rupiya 2003, 30–36).
As the number of participants increased, it became more difficult to reach a sub-
stantial agreement. To keep the process going, it became necessary to narrow the
agenda. Eventually, the content of the talks consisted only of power-sharing
(Rogier 2004, 39). The DRC never developed a comprehensive peace agreement:
the major agreements consisted of ceasefires.
In December 2002, the ICD converted previous agreements into the Congolese
major peace agreement, known as the ‘Global and All-Inclusive Agreement and
Final Act of Endorsement’. This agreement’s final endorsement act was signed
in mid-April 2003 in Sun City. A power-sharing government was installed in Kin-
shasa. For a two-year period, the transitional government was tasked with restor-
ing political order through national elections and further with implementing the
terms of previous agreements, especially the ones of Lusaka and Pretoria agree-
ments (All-Inclusive Agreement 2003; Dagne 2005, 2–4).
The DRC is thus not a clear-cut case of mediators insisting on inclusive but
counterproductive negotiation strategies. By initially denying their involvement
with fighters in the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda obviated the need to be included
in the negotiations. Internally, the Kinshasa Governments and major rebel
groups in the DRC wanted to negotiate only with each other. Some mediators
wanted to include only those who escaped the label of ‘negative forces’ (such
as the FDLR and the LRA). Congolese parties to the negotiations, especially Con-
golese civil society groups and members of non-armed opposition groups, initially
did not really care about these ‘negative forces’, seen simply as trouble-bearing
foreigners.
After the power-sharing government was installed in Kinshasa in June 2003, the
violence intensified. Again the situation worsened (for example, see Autessere
2006; Coghlan et al. 2006).
New armed groups emerged. Some of RCD-Goma’s hardliners supported the cre-
ation of several Congolese Tutsi-led militias, backed by Rwanda, in the eastern pro-
vinces. Tutsi communities, the RCD-Goma said, had to arm and organise
themselves for self-defence against an impending genocide. Out of the Tutsi com-
munities in Northern Kivu emerged a prominent organisation, the National Con-
gress for the Defense of the People (CNDP). Led by Rwanda-trained leaders such
as Laurent Nkunda and Jules Mutebutsi, the CNDP was not only willing and able
to fight but also dominated their area economically. In reaction to the CNDP, the
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number of militias in eastern Congo increased rapidly, while the ex-FAR/Intera-
hamwe groups, with the help of the transitional government, recruited militants
and expanded their training camps to other provinces (Swart 2004). Ex-FAR/Inter-
ahamwe militias, regrouped into the movement known as the FDLR, operated in
eastern DRC under the noses of MONUC and despite the Congolese Government’s
commitment to disarm them. Rwanda, citing fear of ex-FAR/Interahamwe fighters
and a new genocide, supported the rebel groups in eastern DRC and repeatedly
threatened to invade the Congo and forcibly disarm them (Swart 2004, 1–7). In
the far northeast, the LRA was a significant actor, but usually in the more remote
areas.
The resource exploitation networks never missed a beat. A 2009 UN Report (for
example) noted that the governments of Burundi, the DRC, Tanzania, and
Uganda, linked to people based in France, Germany, and Spain, were still
heavily involved in the illegal exploitation of the DRC’s resources.13
It can be said that the negotiations, elections, and transitional government of the
DRC were all failures. The negotiations did not produce much more than a cease-
fire. The violence intensified. The transitional government of Kabila Senior and
Junior, like previous governments, did not seem all that concerned with the suffer-
ing of the people of the DRC. The 2006 election did not usher in a period of calm
post-conflict reconstruction. The DRC’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)
estimated 278 political parties to exist at that time, with 33 candidates competing
for the presidency. About 9000 candidates competed for the 500 seats of the new
federal parliament.14 Costs skyrocketed. International donors including the Euro-
pean Union, Denmark, Ireland, SA’s IEC, and the UN helped the DRC’s IEC
(Khadiagala 2009, 76) to cover well over $1b of the total elections’ costs,
perhaps one of the most expensive elections in political history (Booysen 2007).
Yet having an elected government is an essential part of managing conflict, for
two reasons.
First, a free and fair election allows the winner to claim legitimacy: the winner
is entitled to speak for the people of the DRC. This government can legitimately
negotiate with other countries, take their seat in international bodies, enter into
contracts, etc.
Second, an election should demonstrate that armed groups, the CNDP and the
FDLR in particular, cannot by violence gain political power for themselves or ruin
others who compete more civilly.
By these standards, the election was the key event of the management of vio-
lence during the 2003–2006 years. MONUC contributed heavily to the dramatic
reduction of violence during the election, mainly by deterring violence through,
among others, patrols, the display of force on roads and in towns, and the sheer
force of numbers (Gambino 2008). To this day, spoiler groups such as the
CNDP, the FDLR, and the LRA have been unable to win or disrupt an election.
Protection of civilians in a partitioned government
Apart from the fear of a DRC without an elected government, conflict managers
feared a rising tide of violence against civilians, including UN personnel.
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Managing the violence has been an evolving affair, beginning with international
support of MONUC and ending with the de facto partitioning of the DRC into
DRC- and UN-controlled areas.
(i) Foreign military aid to MONUC: Operation Artemis
Increased violence especially in Ituri in 2003 pressured the UN to deploy a
special French-led force, named Operation Artemis, to help MONUC reduce
the level of violence in Ituri (Khadiagala 2009, 76).
Apart from Operation Artemis, the UN responded to the deteriorating situation
elsewhere by increasing MONUC’s size and amending its mandate to include the
use of force. Nevertheless, the situation in eastern DRC continued to deteriorate.
By 2004, the level of violence was similar to that in 1998. Bukava (South Kivu’s
capital) fell to the CNDP (see Swart 2004, 1–7; Wolters 2004, 2–17). President
Joseph Kabila ordered an immediate deployment of more than 10,000 soldiers,
appealed for support from the Congolese population, and declared the actions
of the CNDP both an act of war and a violation of the Pretoria agreement by
Rwanda (Swart 2004, 1–7). Rwanda responded by denying its involvement and
insisted that the Congolese Government carry out its part of the Pretoria Accord
by disarming the ex-FAR/Interahamwe militias and allied Congolese groups
(Breytenbach et al. 1999; Clark, The Monitor 10 October 2004, 12–27;
Kagame 2003; Alusala 2005; Curtis 2005; Rogier 2005, 3–24). MONUC even-
tually negotiated a ceasefire.
In 2008, the CNDP attacked Goma again. But in early 2009, the CNDP was
defeated during a Rwandan 45-day intervention. The Rwandan Government, which
had already withdrawn Mutebutsi, arrested Nkunda. This illustrates, first, that a
group can fall out with its ethnic allies: ethnicity is not the determining factor as it
is so often said to be in the Great Lakes. Second, the most important armed groups
of the east, the CNDP and the FDLR, are both heavily dependent on their patrons.
There is no military solution to this patronage. Once the DRC and Rwanda agreed
politically (in the Goma Accord of early 2009), Nkunda was under house arrest.
(ii) Creating a legitimate means of monopoly of violence: the failure of the
FARDC
An essential complement to the All-Inclusive Agreement (2003) was an agree-
ment about security sector reform in the DRC. All parties agreed that the new
DRC military would consist of a balance between incumbent and rebel groups.
The CNDP was supposed to become part of the federal army of the DRC
(FARDC).
Yet the CNDP refused absorption into the FARDC. Other leaders contested
command appointments. And armed groups of eastern DRC refused to serve
outside of the east. But the main problem was probably that many former rebels
did join the FARDC; in fact by late 2010, 59 insurgent groups had become part
of the FARDC, resulting in a military that is a repository for competing groups.
In late 2009, the USA tried to overcome these problems by creating a ‘model’ bat-
talion of 750 Congolese soldiers; this battalion would inspire and be the role
model for the rest of the FARDC (Axe, Prospect Magazine, 5 November 2010).
But by late 2010, the formation of a new DRC military was still stuck on its
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problems. The FARDC was militarily incompetent and unreliable; indiscipline
prevailed; and wages were both low and erratically paid, resulting in soldiers,
even the better disciplined soldiers, to loot wherever they went (Axe, Prospect
Magazine, 5 November 2010). The failure of security sector reform to produce
or even lay the foundations for a professional military and public order in the
DRC is noteworthy, primarily because security sector reform in the Great Lakes
area was a massive and massively funded undertaking.15 Still, donors used formu-
laic top-down recipe books. Developments on the ground and gender and transi-
tional justice issues were ignored (Faltas and Namwira 2007; Douma et al.
2008; Specker 2008). A partnership with a corrupt and intransigent government
developed; donors or managers realised far too late that this was the case.16
Some scholars think that, given the fact that the DRC conflict is in part a resource
war, security sector reform becomes mission improbable. If armed groups secure
funding by access to portable resources, members of the group gain immediate
rewards; they do not have to share with members of a larger coalition; and the
group does not have to win politically in order for the members to benefit economi-
cally. Therefore, not only small groups survive, but there is also an incentive for
small groups to emerge in the first place (Collier and Hoeffler 2000). The relative
ease of small groups’ military successes against the FARDC then either bred a mili-
tary opportunism among these small groups or led them to cling to what they have
gained by violence (Mamdani, Mail & Guardian, May 23–29, 1997, 10). Against
this, security sector reform does not stand much of a chance.
But it may well be that donors and managers do not really know what to do with
the security sector in the DRC. One reason is the size of men and women under
arms, reportedly in the vicinity of 150,000; this number includes nearly 30,000
children (Faltas and Namwira 2007). Another reason is the complexity of the
armed groups, whose internal dynamics are often impossible to discern
(Gambino 2008, 9–19). Take the case of the RCD. It became a political party
during the peacemaking and was a member of the transitional government. But
the RCD continued to split, leaving dissidents to find patrons or make a new pol-
itical home for themselves (Nduru, New Internationalist 371, 1 September 2004,
4–5). New armed factions thus emerge with deadly regularity. These groups were
highly opportunistic; they served their patron Rwanda’s interests, but often
clashed with other Rwanda-supported group in the DRC.
Cursed partnership: the FARDC and MONUC
The Goma Accord’s promise of peace was short-lived. As violence spread again in
the east in 2008, MONUC’s leaders in the DRC made a decision that they would
soon regret: MONUC would collaborate with the FARDC in trying to create a
FARDC monopoly of legitimate violence. MONUC was to provide primarily
logistical aid.
The FARDC victimised thousands of people as they tried to conquer the east.
The UN reported of a large proportion of rape cases by the FARDC.17 MONUC
tried to recover from the outcry that followed. UN enquiries led to the replacement
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of both the heads, civilian and military, of MONUC. The UN also initiated several
education projects on child protection, human rights, and sexual violence for the
FARDC soldiers and the Congolese police, notoriously famous for incompetence
and corruption (Gambino 2008, 15).
By the end of 2010, it was clear to MONUC’s leaders that if MONUC was to
retain credibility, it had to keep its distance from the FARDC. Without a colla-
borative relationship with the FARDC and a tenuous relationship with the
Kabila Government, MONUC monopolises the legitimate means of violence in
eastern DRC. This may not be much of a peace. But it is preferable to the previous
alternatives.
(iii) Governance partitioned: the UN, international donors, and NGOs
When the UN created MONUC’s military mission, the goal was to protect the
500 unarmed observers of the Lusaka ceasefire. In 2002, a total of 5500 troops
were involved (Khadiagala 2009, 72). By 31 October 2009, MONUC consisted
of 18,606 uniformed personnel, 1008 international civilian personnel, 2611
local civilian staff, and 628 UN volunteers—the largest UN mission in
history.18 MONUC certainly was also the most expensive mission in the history
of the UN, costing over US$1 billion per year.19
Soon after August 1998, when Rwanda and Uganda invaded the DRC, the Con-
golese military either deserted or defected. Since that time, the DRC Government
has not been able to claim to control eastern DRC. Rwanda-backed rebels con-
trolled North Kivu and South Kivu, as well as the Maniema province. Uganda con-
trolled most of Ituri. The DRC Government’s strongest reach came to an end at a
diagonal line, running from Gbadolite in the northwest to the southern end of the
Tanganyika province. Only west of this line is the DRC governance relatively
secure (Weiss and Carayannis 2004, 105–142; Thom 2010, 191).
In eastern DRC, the UN, other countries’ agencies, and NGOs are the pillars of
governance.20 USAID, for example, is heavily involved in health services. Huma-
nitarian aid and campaigns to counter diseases by, for example, vaccination, have
made a big difference.21 The positive impact of international actors on eastern
DRC is probably explained by the fact that the population of the east is but a
small part of the DRC population.22 But some services, such as education, are
in complete disrepair (Gambino 2008, 9–19).
Another indication of the DRC Government’s lack of capacity in the east
occurred in 2002 with the withdrawal of Uganda troops from north-eastern
Ituri. The DRC Government asked Uganda to delay its withdrawal and leave
1000 troops to police that part of the province (Thom 2010, 194). In the east, it
was MONUC that shouldered the responsibility for deterring attacks on civilians.
In doing so, MONUC kept its distance from the weak, corrupt, and unmotivated
FARDC and Congolese police. MONUC’s activities escalated and expanded
quite dramatically during elections (Gambino 2008, 9–19). MONUC is populated
by professional soldiers, with Indian troops primarily deployed in North Kivu and
Pakistan troops in South Kivu.
Immediately after the 2006 election, expectations of what was possible in the
DRC soared. But five years later, it has been conceded that the DRC Government’s
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stronghold is much in the west of the diagonal Gbadolite–Tanganyika line. The
FARDC is not soon going to establish a legitimate monopoly of violence over
the entire DRC. In fact, the FARDC23 at times is as big a menace as the FDLR,
the LRA, or the CNDP. With civilians being victimised by nearly all armed
groups, MONUC’s mission is understandable: protect civilians. MONUC tries
to do this by the deterrence of primarily numbers.
Why has MONUC’s strategy become one of protecting civilians by outnumber-
ing any given proxy, rebel, or resource network force?
Except for the CNDP and the FDLR, none of the armed groups (in the east) have
since 1996 shown a willingness to fight another armed group. When opponents do
meet, the weaker quickly flees or the opponents come to some arrangement about
who will get what. On the move, the members of armed groups stick to roads, dirt
tracks, or footpaths, and these can be attacked/blocked by MONUC’s air and
armour capabilities. So the skirmishes—they can hardly be called battles—tend
to be brief.
Civilians are at their most vulnerable when one group flees an area and another
moves in: the new masters of the area will victimise civilians for real and imagined
support of the departed masters. MONUC does not yet have an answer to this vic-
timisation. And when a determined group, such as the CNDP, wants to attack,
MONUC struggles to hold its own. Civilians know this and usually flee (Thom
2010, 179–194).24
Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed how spoilers were managed in the Congolese
peace efforts between 1996 and 2010. Through this exercise, we developed an
understanding of how spoilers are managed in a conflict characterised by both
interstate and intrastate dynamics.
Peacemaking scholars agree that spoilers must be managed. Certainly the
DRC’s peace process shows that a multitude of peacemakers, from the start,
thought that spoilers needed to be managed.
Our discussion suggests that a favoured method of managing spoilers, by inclu-
sivity, is much more complex in practice than suggested in the literature. Current
practice, at least as displayed in the DRC peacemaking processes, shows that we
do not fully appreciate the realities of factionalism and splintering in armed groups
or recognise that inclusivity may well, albeit unintentionally, provide new groups
with an incentive to use violence.
The task of managing spoilers in the DRC was actively sought by SA. Were the
problems in the management of spoilers a result of SA being the mediator? SA did
bring a set of problems to the process, but for reasons produced by its own national
experience, SA was devoted to the principle of inclusivity. In all probability, any
mediator would have encountered the same problems.
A considerable part of the management of spoilers in the DRC since 1998 has
been devoted to interstate spoilers and Rwanda in particular. By 2001, Rwanda’s
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security concerns had been sufficiently recognised for the Kagame Government to
commit itself to not invading, occupying, or conquering the DRC in part or as a
whole. But the efforts to end Rwanda’s interference in the DRC by means of
proxies in the DRC have never met with success.
Since 2002, the DRC has in fact been portioned, not legally but certainly in
terms of who controls what. Much of the east of the diagonal line from Gbadolite
to the southern end of the Tanganyika province is the territory of Congolese rebels,
Rwandan and Ugandan proxies, and resource networks. These are the intrastate
spoilers. The FARDC is not soon going to establish control over the east or
these spoilers; quite the contrary, the FARDC (as well as the Congolese police)
is as big a menace as the proxies of Rwanda and Uganda.
We have argued that it becomes essential in managing spoilers in the DRC that
armed groups not win elections or disrupt them. A winner in a free and fair elec-
tion is entitled to speak for all the people of the DRC, even those beyond routine
administrative reach. It is during elections that the international community, such
as it is, mobilises all its energies in the DRC. MONUC contributed heavily to the
dramatic reduction of violence during the 2006 elections, mainly by deterrent
actions. Major spoiler groups such as the CNDP, the LRA, and the FDLR have
been unable to win or disrupt an election.
We have also argued that the more difficult task is to protect civilians east of the
diagonal line between elections. By all accounts, the reform of the DRC security
sector has been a massive failure; the FARDC will not soon compel proxies,
rebels, and resource networks to submit to the DRC Government’s authority.
That leaves MONUC. Even with good professional troops at hand and Chapter
7’s authorisation, MONUC is unlikely to do anything but practise deterrence.
When MONUC tried a strategy and collaborated with the FARDC, it nearly
destroyed the UN mission. Perhaps the FARDC’s collaboration with elite forces
from France and the USA offers some hope, but two good battalions, even five,
in the FARDC do not make a professional military.
MONUC’s success, in the sense of preventing things from getting even worse,
is largely due to the fact that by outnumbering the spoilers and inhibiting their
movement, MONUC will not be attacked by proxy, rebel, or resource network
groups—except for the CNDP and the FDLR. MONUC’s casualties have thus
been remarkably low for such a large force; this is a key factor in the
willingness of countries to contribute to MONUC. And MONUC undoubtedly
does help contain the victimisation of civilians. So a coalition of the willing
remains willing.
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1. In 2010, MONUC’s name was changed to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO).
2. Primarily young men organised into para-military groups.
3. In Burundi, armed groups that were excluded from the Arusha process increased their use of violence quite
noticeably between June 1999 and January 2000, thus making ‘themselves significant players in less than one
year’. See Daley (2007, 344).
4. Literally ‘those from Rwanda’ in Swahili.
5. In Rwanda, 11 famines were recorded between 1895 and 1945. The latest occurred in 1990. See Lemarchand
(2000, 330) and Prunier (1998, 88).
6. In Rwanda, Hutus and Tutsi were originally terms denoting political class or status, with Hutu meaning
‘ruled’ and Tutsi ‘ruler’, and applied to a society containing many crosscutting cleavages. The Belgians
destroyed the system’s flexibility: Hutu and Tutsi came to describe racial categories with Tutsi destined to
rule because of their declared similarity to Caucasian people. Numerous authors have analysed how ethnicity
was constructed in Rwanda; how the constructions were driven by claims about entitlement to power; how a
zero-sum view of who could hold power developed; and how the possession political power was synonymous
with economic power. See Mamdani (2002), Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002a, 93), Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002b, 219),
and Prunier (1998, 39).
7. Banyamulenge, literally meaning ‘the people of Mulenge’, refers to Rwandan Tutsi living in the high plateau
of South Kivu. The name was likely adopted in the 1960s by earlier Tutsi settlers to distinguish themselves
from more recent refugees from Burundi and Rwanda. See Lemarchand (2001, 56) and Jackson (1996, 108).
8. We develop our definition after reviewing Stedman’s contribution (1997).
9. The UN deployment proceeded at a glacial pace. The Kabila Sr Government took the UN’s arrival on its soil
as insulting and wanted the UN territorially restricted to territory not controlled by it or the RCD. See Braeck-
man (Le Monde Diplomatique, 7 April 2001, 2–5), Swart and Solomon (2004, 15–23), and Cilliers and
Malan (2001, 10–66).
10. See ‘the Peace Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Rwanda and the Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo’. Available online at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/drc_rwanda/drc_rwanda_pa07302002.
html (accessed 25 August, 2006).
11. With these agreements in place, the RCD-Goma, the most powerful of the RCDs, returned to the ICD.
12. As noted earlier, the Sun City meetings of late 2001, the ICD already had more than 350 participating del-
egates. See Khadiagala (2009, 73).
13. See the UN Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo UN/S/2009/603.
14. See http://www.cei-rdc.cd/ (accessed 22 December, 2009).
15. The programme is the Multi-Country Demobilization and Re-integration programme.
See http://www.mdrp. org/ (accessed 25 August, 2009). This programme was concluded in 2010.
16. See ‘Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration. Final Report’.
17. See http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsID=17897 (accessed 12 August, 2009).
18. See http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/facts.shtml (accessed 22 December, 2009).
19. See http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/C.5/63/25 (accessed 22 December, 2009). See
also the UN Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo UN/S/2009/603.
20. The important actors in humanitarian assistance are the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Inter-
national Medical Corps, the World Food Programme, the UNHCR, USAID, and Action Against Hunger.
21. Done by the UN Children’s Fund; the UN World Health Organization; and Doctors Without Borders (MSF).
22. The eastern DRC, defined as four provinces, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, and Orientale, is 14 m. The
population of the DRC is 72 m (numbers rounded off). See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/cg.html (accessed 7 June, 2011).
23. Or the Congolese police.
24. Complementary statements by Anthony W Gambino, former head of USAID in the DRC, during a meeting
with the class WWS 401e Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Central and Southern Africa: Dealing with Past
Abuses of Violence, Princeton University, and the various reports of MONUC.
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